In this paper, we consider a hierarchical control based DC microgrid (DCmG) equipped with unknown input observer (UIO) based detectors, and investigate false data injection (FDI) attacks against the secondary control layer. First, we point out that the fundamental limitation of the UIO-based detector comes from the unknown inputs, whose dynamics can be utilized to construct zero trace undetectable (ZTU) attacks causing zero impact on detection residuals. Furthermore, we extend ZTU attacks to nonzero trace undetectable (NTU) attacks by utilizing the system noise, under which the detection residuals are still bounded by certain detection thresholds. Then, by approximating primary control loops as unit gains, we theoretically analyze attack impacts of NTU attacks on voltage balancing and current sharing in the DCmG. Moreover, we propose a countermeasure against ZTU and NTU attacks by observing the average PCC voltage deviation. Finally, extensive simulations are conducted in Simulink/PLECS to validate theoretical results and effectiveness of the countermeasure.
Introduction
During the past decade, the microgrid, which is composed of DGUs, storage devices, and flexible loads, has become the most promising solution to integrate distributed generation units (DGUs) such as photovoltaic (PV) arrays and wind turbines into the distribution grid [2] . Recently, tremendous growth in DC loads such as laptop computers, LED lights, and telecommunication centers indicates that the DC microgrid (DCmG) can be an economic and feasible solution in addressing the future energy needs. Generally, a hierarchical control framework is adopted in the DCmG. In the primary control layer, the basic control problem is to track local reference voltage [3] . In the secondary control layer, each DGU's reference voltage is regulated through a centralized/distributed communication network to achieve current sharing and voltage balancing [4, 5] . However, communication networks have little knowledge of the system model (plant/control /detection parameters). Actually, intelligent attackers can learn critical system parameters after penetrating into the system, and launch attacks at an appropriate time coordinately, which can cause devastating damage such as the Stuxnet [14] . Therefore, it is necessary to investigate what attackers can do when they have some model knowledge, which can provide novel design insights to mitigate potential security threats in DCmGs.
In this paper, we make an effort to explore potential FDI attacks under the UIO-based detector in the DCmG [13] . Compared to the previous work [1] , we provide comprehensive characterizations of undetectable FDI attacks and propose the corresponding countermeasure in the DCmG, and main contributions are listed as follows: First, we characterize zero trace undetectable (ZTU) and nonzero trace undetectable (NTU) attacks under the UIO-based detector. Then, by approximating primary control loops as static unit gains [4] , we theoretically analyze attack impacts on current sharing and voltage balancing in the DCmG. Finally, we propose the corresponding countermeasure against ZTU and NTU attacks based on the average point of common coupling (PCC) voltage deviation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the DCmG model and Section 3 shows the problem formulation. Then, Section 4 characterizes undetectable attacks under the UIO-based detector and attack impacts are analyzed in Section 5. And the corresponding countermeasure is proposed in Section 6. Finally, extensive simulations are presented in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes this paper.
DCmG Model
Notation: In this paper, |·| calculates the cardinality of finite set and component-by-component absolute value of a matrix/vector, · calculates the norm of a matrix/vector, inequalities of matrices/vectors are compared component-by-component, and y(∞) = lim t→∞ y(t).
1 n /1 n×n and 0 n /0 n×n denote vectors/matrices with all 1 and 0 entries, respectively, and I n denotes the unit matrix with n × n dimension. Moreover, H 1 denotes the subspace of R n composed by all vectors satisfying v = 1 n n i=1 v i = 0, where v denotes the average of all entries in vector v. Obviously, each vector in H 1 has n − 1 freedom 1 , indicating that the dimension of H 1 is n − 1, i.e., dim{H 1 } = n − 1. The orthogonal subspace of H 1 is represented by H 1 ⊥ , satisfying v = α1 n , α ∈ R, ∀v ∈ H 1 ⊥ , and dim{H 1 ⊥ } = 1. And R n can be decomposed as H 1 H 1 ⊥ , where calculates the direct sum of subspaces.
Network Models
A weighted directed graph (digraph) is denoted by G = {ν, ε, W }, where ν = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of nodes, 1 Any n − 1 entries in the vector can be set arbitrarily. ε ⊆ ν × ν is the set of edges, and the diagonal matrix W = diag{a ij } ∈ R |ε|×|ε| . a ij is the weight of edge (i, j) ∈ ε and the set of neighbors of node i is
which is independent of the orientations of edges.
Electrical and Communication Networks: The electrical network of DCmG is represented by weighted digraph G el = {ν, ε el , W el }, where nodes are DGUs, edges are power lines whose orientations define reference directions of positive currents, and edge weights are conductances of power lines, i.e., 1/R ij . Moreover, the set of neighbors of node i is N el i , |ν| = N and L(G) = M . The unencrypted (encrypted) communication network of DCmG is denoted by weighted graph
where the weight a c ij = a c ji (a ec ij = a ec ji ), i.e., the communication is bidirectional, and a c ij > 0 (a ec ij > 0) if edge (i, j) ∈ ε c ((i, j) ∈ ε ec ). The set of neighbors of node i is N c i (N ec i ), and L(G c ) = L (L(G ec ) = L e ). Assumption 1: The weighted digraphs G c and G el are both weakly connected 2 . Moreover, G c and G el have the same topology, and L = M . Assumption 2: The digraph G ec is weakly connected and ε c ⊆ ε ec . Remark 1: Assumption 1 is established to guarantee globally and exponentially stable control of the DCmG according to [4] , under which DGU i need know the resistances R ij of all power lines connecting it to its electrical neighbors j, ∀j ∈ N el i . Given the quasi-stationary line approximations of power line dynamics [3] , R ij can be estimated through R ij = |Vj −Vi| Iij in steady-state, where I ij is the current on power line (i, j), V i and I ij are measured by DGU i locally, and V j is transmitted from DGU j to DGU i over G ec . Moreover, Assumption 2 gives some basic properties of G ec to make the proposed countermeasure effective.
Dynamics Model
According to Fig.1 , each DGU contains a DC voltage source, a buck converter, a local load current and a RLC (resistor, inductor, and capacitor) filter. V ti is the output voltage of DC buck converter, I Li is the load current, and V i and I ti are the PCC voltage and output current, respectively. The hierarchical control framework is deployed in each DGU, where the primary controller tracks local reference voltage and the secondary consensus layer regulates local reference voltage to achieve current sharing and voltage balancing in the DCmG [4] . The dynam-
where [3] . Moreover, we assume the process noise and measurement noise satisfy the following assumption. Assumption 3: The process noise and measurement noise are unknown-but-bounded (UBB) i.e., |ω
Remark 2: There exist several practical situations where the noise is UBB. For example, the noise during the audio design is a set of narrow-band signals with frequency spectrum range from 20HZ to 20KHZ [15] . And the bounds of system noise depend on the bounds of parameter variation and sensor's quantization error [16] .
The primary control input is u i (t) = V ti = k T i y i (t), where k i ∈ R 3 depends only on local information [3] . The secondary control input is obtained through the following consensus scheme:
where y c i,j (t) ∈ R 3 is the output of DGU j transmitted to DGU i over G c , I s ti > 0, I s tj > 0 are corresponding rated currents, and k I > 0 is an invariant parameter. Without loss of generality, we assume the nominal reference voltages satisfy Assumption 4 as in [4] . And the control objectives are formulated in Definitions 1-2. 
Attack Model
We consider the FDI attack injecting malicious signal into the communication link, which is modeled as
where y c i,j (t) is the corrupted data that DGU i receives from DGU j through link (i, j) ∈ ε c , φ i,j (t) is the attack vector and τ (t − T a ) is the step function with T a delay. Obviously, the attack is started at t = T a , and y c i,j (t) = y j (t), t ≤ T a . Furthermore, the attacker can get some static plant/control/detection parameters of each DGU from the insider, but is hard to intrude into DGUs due to various host-based defense mechanisms [17] .
UIO-based Detector
A bank of UIO-based detectors is deployed in each DGU to detect and identify the FDI attack (3) according to [13] . First, we transform the dynamics model of DGU j, j ∈ N c i to the typical UIO structure:
where
is a known parameter related to the capacitor parameter C tj as follows.
Given Theorem 1 in [18] and C j = I 3 , we can construct the full order UIO deployed in DGU i as
under which the state estimation error decays exponentially to a certain range related to the system noise regardless of the unknown input vectord j (t).
where K 1 , K 2 , T j ∈ R 3×3 , H j is defined in (5) , and h 12 , h 22 , h 32 ∈ R. Note that K 1 should be appropriately chosen to make F j stable, and (7) is determined once H j and K 1 are given. Let i,j (t) = x j (t) −x i,j (t) and r i,j (t) = i,j (t)+ρ j (t) be the state estimation error and detection residual of (6), respectively, in the absence of attacks. And the analytical expression of r i,j (t) is
The initial state estimation error i,j (0) can be bounded by the bound of measurement noise as C j = I 3 , i.e., | i,j (0)| ≤ ρ j . Moreover, there always exist positive constants κ, µ such that ||e F j t || ≤ κe −µt as F j is stable. Then, the upper bound of |r i,j (t)| is
As d j (t) contains the load current and physical couplings, daily operations such as load switches and pluggingin/out of DGUs will not affect r i,j (t). Therefore, once
it is believed that y c i,j (t) is corrupted by FDI attack (3). And the false alarm and the missed alarm under the UIO-based detector are formally defined as follows. Definition 3: If (9) is triggered when there exists no FDI attack (3), then it is called a False Alarm; If (9) is not triggered when there exists FDI attack (3), then it is called a Missed Alarm.
Problems of Interest
Although zero false alarm can be achieved under the UIO-based detector (6) and the trigger condition (9), zero missed alarm cannot be guaranteed simultaneously. In other words, there exist some undetectable attacks. First, we characterize the detection residual under FDI attack (3) 
On the one hand, (9) can be immediately trigged once |r a i,j (t)| > 2r i,j (t) [13] . On the other hand, the FDI attack (3) is undetectable under the UIO-based detector if and only if |r i,j (t)| ≤r i,j (t). Moreover, since C j = I 3 , there exists no invariant zero in (4) according to Definition 4.4.1 in [19] , indicating the absence of zero dynamics. Therefore, distinguished from the zero dynamics attack in [20] , we aim to further explore undetectable FDI attacks under the characteristics of the UIO-based detector in this paper. According to zero/nonzero r a i,j (t), we divide undetectable FDI attacks under the UIO-based detector into the following two forms.
Definition 5:
We aim to solve three problems in this paper: (1) How to characterize undetectable FDI attacks under the UIObased detector (ZTU and NTU attacks)? (P1).(2) How will undetectable FDI attacks affect voltage balancing and current sharing? (P2). How to counteract undetectable FDI attacks in the DCmG? (P3).
Undetectable Attacks under the UIO-based Detector
In this section, we characterize undetectable attacks under the UIO-based detector (6) given the typical UIO form (4) . Obviously, the UIO-based detector cannot distinguish the malicious data mimicking dynamics of the unknown input vectord j (t) in (4) from normal measurement, and thus we have the following result.
for t ≥ T a , where x a j (t) ∈ R 3 , then the attack (3) is ZTU. Proof: (If)According to (4) , the Laplace form of y c i,j (t) under (13) is
where s is the Laplacian andd j (s) =d j (s) +d a ij (s). Obviously, (14) is equivalent to the output of (4) where the unknown input vectord j (t) is switched tod j (t) at t = T a . Since the detection residual r i,j (t) is invariant regardless of unknown inputs, the attack (3) satisfying (13) is ZTU. (Only If)According to Definition 4, we get
Given r a i,j (T a ) = 0 3 and (10), we get (H j +T j )φ i,j (T a ) = 0 3 . And H j + T j = I 3 according to (7) , indicating that φ i,j (T a ) = 0 3 . After substituting φ i,j (T a ) = 0 3 into (10), we can transformṙ a i,
Moreover, as T jĒj = 0 3×2 and rank(T j ) + rank(Ē j ) = 3, the image ofĒ j is consistent with the null space of T j . Meanwhile, according to (7), we have T j A kj = F j T j + K j . Therefore, the solution of (15) is equivalent to (13) , which completes the proof. By extending ZTU attack (13) to nonzero initial state case based on system noise in (4), we get the NTU attack.
, andĨ 3 is derived from the unit matrix I 3 with its (2, 2) th diagonal entry replaced by 0.
Proof: Combining (5), (7) and (18), we get T j φ i,j (T a ) = 0 3 , indicating that (17) and (18) are the solution of
. Then, (10) can be transformed to r a i,j (t) = e F j (t−Ta) φ i,j (T a ). Therefore, we get
Since |σ 2i,j (0)| ≤σ 2i,j (0) and |σ 3i,j (T a )| ≤σ 3i,j (T a ), there always exists a nonzeroσ i,j (T a ) satisfying
, t ≥ T a , and thus (17) and (18) . And thus FDI attack (3) under (17) and (18) is NTU, which completes the proof. Remark 3: In Theorems 1-2, we reveal that the fundamental limitation of the UIO-based detector (6) comes from the unknown input vectord j (t), whose dynamics can be exploited to construct ZTU and NTU attacks. On the one hand, the UIO-based detector (6) can reduce required inputs to estimate it's neighboring DGUs' states.
On the other hand, the unknown inputs will increase the threats of undetectable attacks. Therefore, unknown inputs of the UIO-based detector need be appropriately chosen to balance the costs of transmitting additional inputs, e.g., more communication packets, and the threats of undetectable attacks. Remark 4: According to (13) , the ZTU attack vector can be arbitrarily large as (A kj ,Ē j ) is controllable, and the initial state of NTU attack vector φ i,j (T a ) is mainly constrained by e F j Taσ 3i,j (T a ), which converges to a nonzero constant as T a grows.
Attack Impacts Analysis in the DCmG
In this section, we analyze impacts of NTU attacks (17) in the DCmG, which contains impacts of ZTU attacks (13) . Although the NTU attack vector φ i,j (t) can be arbitrarily large with well designedd a ij (t),d a ij (t) should be bounded to make the corrupted measurement y c i,j (t) physically reachable given the maximal/minimal PCC voltage and output current in each DGU. Therefore, we consider the most common and practical case wherē d a ij (t) is a bounded constant, and constantd a ij (t) is simplified asd a ij . Then, the attack vector is
whereφ i,j (T a ) = φ i,j (T a ) + A −1 kjĒ jd a ij ∈ R 3 . Under NTU attacks, we simplify primary control loops as unit gains according to [4] , i.e.,ṽ
T is the secondary control input vector under attacks. Given (2) and (3), we havėψ
, k = [0, 1, 0], and l i =0 N i ∈ R N is derived from 0 N with its i th entry replaced by 1 to denote the targeted DGU i. According to the Kirchhoff current law, the output current vector is decomposed as i t (t) = Mṽ(t) + i l , where i l = [I L1 , · · · , I LN ] T is the constant load current vector. Therefore, combining (21) with (22), we geṫψ
where Q =LDM . Similar to the detection residual, ψ(t) is decomposed asψ(t) = ψ(t)+ψ a (t), where ψ a (t) denotes the attack impacts on ψ(t). Note that ψ a (t) will not converge with nonzerod a ij , under which neither voltage balancing nor current sharing can be achieved in the DCmG. Proof: The Proof is given in Appendix A of [21] . Moreover, we consider the case where NTU attack vectors (20) are injected into multi-linksε a ⊆ ε c cooperatively, under which ψ a (t) will finally converge. Theorem 4: Under cooperative NTU attacks (20) satisfying
we get ψ a (∞) = − (i,j)∈εa C a ij N kA −1 kjφ i,j (T a ), and current sharing is not achieved if and only if (i,j)∈εa C a ij kφ i,j (∞)l i = 0 N . Proof: The Proof is given in Appendix B of [21] . Remark 5: Once the attacker compromises one link (i, j) ∈ ε c , any NTU attack with nonzerod a ij can destabilize the DCmG. Moreover, if the attacker compromises multi-linksε a cooperatively, then the average PCC voltage can be manipulated with cooperative NTU attacks (20) satisfying (25) , which can cause precise attack impacts (e.g., economic losses) to the DCmG.
Corresponding Countermeasure
In this section, we propose the countermeasure against NTU and ZTU attacks based on the encrypted communication network G ec , through which the confidentiality and integrity of transmission data can be assured [22] . The countermeasure is composed of the attack detection phase and the impact counteraction phase.
Attack Detection Phase
We consider ZTU and NTU attacks causing steady-state average PCC voltage deviation in this paper, which can be observed through the proportional-integral average dynamics consensus (PIADC) based estimator deployed in each DGU. Then, the detection indicator d i (t) is derived from the estimated average PCC voltage deviation, and a certain detection threshold is chosen to tolerate the fluctuations caused by daily operations, e.g., load switches and plugging-in/out of DGUs.
PIADC-based Estimator
The PIADC-based estimator in DGU i is
is the estimated average PCC voltage, and γ, K P , K I are positive gains invariant in all DGUs. Given Theorems 1-2 in [23] and Assumption 2,v i (t) can track constant and ramp average PCC voltages ṽ(t) regardless of initial statesv i (0), ζ i (0) with certain γ, K P , K I , a ec ij . Therefore, under single and cooperative NTU attacks (20) , we always havē
wherev(∞) = [v 1 (∞), · · · ,v N (∞)] T . Moreover, as encryption and decryption processes are time-consuming due to the limited computation capability of each DGU, we aim to encrypt/decrypt only the PIADC-related data to balance the trade off between security and control performance of the DCmG.
Sliding Time Window (STW) based Detector
The estimated average PCC voltage deviation is v err
Although daily operations never cause nonzero v err i (∞) in the DCmG, non-trivial instantaneous value of v err i (t) will emerge as it takes some time forv i (t) to converge as Fig.3 shows. And it is difficult to distinguish attacks from daily operations based only on v err i (t), which means daily operations may cause non-neglectable false alarms. To solve the problem, we first flatten the fluctuations caused by daily operations based on sliding time window technology and yield the detection indicator d i (t):
where T is the fixed length of sliding time window, t = t s is the activation time, and d i (t) calculates the integral of the sliding time window over |v err i (t)|. And the generation algorithm of d i (t) is given in Appendix F of [21] . Then, a detection threshold is chosen to tolerate certain daily operations, and the trigger condition of attack alarm is
where ∆ v > 0 denotes the least steady-state average PCC voltage deviation that can be detected after tolerating daily operations. Obviously, ∆ v need cover the maximal average of the integral of the sliding time window over |v err i (t)| caused by daily operations, which can be far smaller than the maximum of |v err i (t)| if T is big enough, and thus d i (t) can decrease the number of missed alarms caused by tolerating daily operations.
Impact Counteraction Phase
Once (30) is triggered at t = T alm i , the estimated average PCC voltage deviation is fed into a proportional-integral (PI) based compensator, i.e.,
where k cp and k ci are positive gains, and the compensation value C i (t) is added to the secondary control input ψ i (t). Therefore, (21) is rewritten as
Given (27) and (28), we get v err i (∞) = − ψ a (∞) − C(∞) . If ψ a (∞) is a constant, then the equilibrium of (31) is achieved with |v err i (∞)| = 0, i.e., voltage balancing is reestablished. If ψ a (∞) is a ramp signal, then the equilibrium of (31) is achieved with nonzero constant |v err i (∞)|, indicating that voltage balancing cannot be reestablished. Therefore, we aim to identify and cut off threating communication links (i, j) ∈ ε c with nonzerod a ij . Under Assumption 2, all output currents I tj (t), ∀j ∈ N c i are retransmitted from DGU j to i over G ec to verify the integrity of ky c i,j (t) after (31) has been activated for T c long, i.e.,
where τ ec approximates the time delay caused by encryption and decryption processes and ∆ I > 0 is a predefined threshold to tolerate the exponentially decaying attack vector 3 , where δ is a predefined threshold to tolerate the oscillating noise inṼ i (t), and C i (T comp i ) is added to the secondary control input as a constant.
Remark 6:
Although the countermeasure is designed given the constantd a ij , we believe that it still works whend a ij (t) is not constant. We discuss two cases as follows: a) ifd a ij (t) decays exponentially to zero, then φ i,j (t) will also decay exponentially to zero according to (17) , under which current sharing can be achieved while voltage balancing is not achieved with constant average PCC voltage deviation. The attack impacts can be totally counteracted by (31) without triggering (32). b) ifd a ij (t) is a sine/cosine signal, then φ i,j (t) will also vary asd a ij (t), under which neither current sharing nor voltage balancing can be achieved. Moreover, v(t) can only track ṽ(t) 1 N with certain tracking error as ṽ(t) varies quickly, and the attack impacts can be counteracted only after all threating communication links with nonzerod a ij (t) are identified and cut off through (32).
Simulations
In simulations, we establish a DCmG composed of 8 DGUs in Matlab Simulink/PLECS, and corresponding parameters can be found in Appendix C of [21] . [21] . Constant time delays τ c = 5ms and τ c + τ ec = 15ms are added into G c and G ec , respectively, to simulate transmission, encryption and decryption processes, and we have further investigated the time delay margin of (26) under different PIADC parameters as shown in Appendix D of [21] . Parameters of PIADC-based estimators are γ = 90, K P = 3.34 and K I = 8, and parameters of STWbased detector are T = 1.3s, ∆ v = 0.4V, δ = 0.005V. Parameters of impact counteraction actions (31),(32) are k cp = 1, k ci = 20, T c = 1s, ∆ I = 0.1A. Fig. 3 , three daily operations will not destroy voltage balancing or current sharing in the DCmG, but they indeed cause some fluctuations on v err i (t), and max 4≤t≤20,i∈ν |v err i (t)| = 4.7V. While the fluctuations on d i (t) can be tolerated by T ∆ v with the cost of missed alarms for steady-state average PCC voltage deviation less than ∆ v = 0.4V < 4.7V, indicating that d i (t) can effectively decrease the number of missed alarms caused by tolerating daily operations. Stage 3 (ZTU/NTU attacks):At t = T a1 = 20s, NTU attacks 1 targeting at communication links (7, 6) and (5, 7) are launched, and attack vectors related parameters ared a 76 =d a 57 = 0 2 , φ 7,6 (T a1 ) = −0.0172 * [1, 0, 1] T , φ 5,7 (T a1 ) = −0.0337 * [1, 0, 1] T . At t = T a2 = 25s, ZTU attack 2 targeting at communication link (8, 3) is launched, and the attack vector related parameters ared a 83 = [−5, 0] T , φ 8,3 (T a2 ) = 0 3 . At t = T a3 = 38s, NTU attacks 3 targeting at communication links (7, 6) and (5, 7) are launched, and attack vectors related parameters ared a 76 = [0, −0.8333] T ,d a 57 = [−10, 0] T , φ 7,6 (T a3 ) = −0.0175 * [1, 0, 1] T , φ 5,7 (T a3 ) = −0.0343 * [1, 0, 1] T . Note that all initial states of NTU attacks satisfy (18) , and NTU attacks 3 satisfy (i,j)∈εa C a ij kφ i,j (∞) = 0. As shown in Fig.4 , no attack alarm is triggered by UIO-based detectors. And according to Fig.3 , the impacts of NTU attacks 1 are totally counteracted by PI-based compensators (31), and voltage balancing is reestablished after t = 22.47s. ZTU attack 2 is detected by DGU 8 at T alm 8a2 = 26.42s, and voltage balancing and current sharing are reestablished after t = 36.69s. NTU attacks 3 are detected by DGU 7 and DGU 5 at T alm 7a3 = 38.70s, T alm 5a3 = 38.76s, respectively, and voltage balancing and current sharing are reestablished after t = 45.5s. Moreover, (32) is not triggered by NTU attacks 1 as both attack vectors decay exponentially to zero, and is triggered by ZTU attack 2 and NTU attacks 3 because of their nonzerod a ij .
Conclusion
In this paper, we revealed that the fundamental limitation of UIO-based detector lies in the unknown inputs, which can expose the DCmG to threats of ZTU and NTU attacks. And it is proved that single NTU attack and cooperative NTU attacks can easily destroy current sharing and voltage balancing in the DCmG. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure can detect ZTU and NTU attacks and counteract the attack impacts effectively. However, there exist several limitations for the proposed countermeasure. First, cooperative NTU attacks can destroy current sharing with small average PCC voltage deviation, which means that the proposed countermeasure may not detect and counteract these attacks. Second, the impact counteraction phase requires to cut off all threating communication links with nonzero attack vectors, which will degrade control performances a lot and even disconnect communication networks. Therefore, it is necessary to detect ZTU and NTU attacks based on the average PCC voltage deviation and quantitative attack impacts on current sharing, simultaneously, and attack impacts may be counteracted by estimating attack vectors through the encrypted communication network, which are left as our future works.
A Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: According to Proposition 3 in [4] , we have a) ker(Q)=H 1 ⊥ , range(Q)= H 1 ; b) Q is diagonalizable and has non-negative eigenvalues, and its algebraic multiplicity of zero eigenvalue is one. Therefore, the eigenvalue eigenvector pairs of Q can be denoted by
⊥ , and {q 2 , ..., q N } constitutes a basis of H 1 . Thus, in the absence of (20), we have
then ψ(∞) = 0 and voltage balancing and current sharing can be achieved at exponential convergence rate λ 2 . And we let ψ a (t) = ψ a1 (t) + ψ a2 (t), where ψ a1 (t) and ψ a2 (t) represent the attack impacts caused by e A kj (t−Ta)φ i,j (T a ) and −A −1 kjĒ jd a j , respectively. As A −1 kjĒ jd a j is a constant vector, ψ a2 (t) can be directly obtained as whereC a ij = C a ij η m a m2 ∈ R and a m2 = ka m ∈ R. As {q 1 , q 2 , ..., q N } constitutes a basis of R N , l i can be decomposed as l i = N r=1 δ r q r , where δ 1 q 1 = l i 1 N = 1 N 1 N , and thus e Qt l i = N r=1 δ r e λrt q r . If β m + λ r = 4 When A kj is not diagonalizable, the stability and convergence properties can be analyzed in a similar way, under which system states can still converge to a stable value but not at an exponential speed. Since A kj is stable, Re(β m ) < 0, ∀m ∈ ν. And given the expression of ψ a1 (t) and
Moreover, as ( 1 βm , a m ), ∀m ∈ ν are the eigenvalue eigenvector pairs of A −1 kj , we have Under nonzerod a ij , ψ a (t) diverges with t, and thus ψ (t) also diverges with t given ψ (t) = ψ(t) + ψ a (t) , where ψ(t) decays exponentially to zero. Thus, ṽ(t) also diverges with t according to (21) , i.e., voltage balancing is not achieved. Moreover, given (A.2), each entry in ψ a2 (t) diverges with t, indicating that all PCC voltages, including the DGUs whose communication links are not attacked, cannot converge. Therefore, we can conclude that current sharing is not achieved either, which completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: According to (20) , φ i,j (∞) = −A −1 kjĒ jd a j , indicating that (i,j)∈εa Given (B.1), we obtain (i,j)∈εa C a ij kφ i,j (∞)l i = 0 N , indicating that (B.3) is solvable. And the solution Dĩ t (∞) / ∈ H 1 ⊥ , which means current sharing is not achieved in the DCmG, if and only if (i,j)∈εa C a ij kφ i,j (∞)l i = 0 N . Therefore, the proof is completed. 
C Parameters of DGUs

D Time Delay Margin
Remark 7: Furthermore, we have investigated the relationships between the time delay margin of the PIADCbased estimator and the PIADC parameters γ, K P , K I and the maximal eigenvalue of L e , i.e., λ e N . As shown in Tables D.1-D.2, smaller PIADC parameters have larger time delay time margin and larger λ e N causes smaller time delay margin, which matches the result of Theorem 10 in [24] . According to Theorem 3.20 in [25] , the lower bound of λ e N is positively related to the number of edges if |ε ec | < N (N −1)
4
. Therefore, higher edgeconnectivity of G ec 6 causes smaller time delay margin if |ε ec | < N (N −1)
. Moreover, λ e N is positively related to the edge weights, and thus larger edge weights lead to smaller time delay margin. 
